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Thompson v. Oklahoma: Debating the
Constitutionality of Juvenile Executions
I. INTRODUCTION
In what was heralded as the "most important capital punishment
decision of the year,"1 the Supreme Court in Thompson v.
Oklahoma2 failed to muster the number of votes necessary to deter-
mine whether the execution of a fifteen-year-old killer constitutes
"cruel and unusual punishment." Without the possible "swing" vote
of a ninth Justice, the Court, in a 4-1-3 split, merely agreed that it
could not agree, thus making the decision of one Justice the deciding
opinion of the Court.
In her concurring opinion, Justice O'Connor rejected both the plu-
rality's conclusion that capital punishment of persons who committed
capital crimes while under the age of sixteen is per se unconstitu-
tional, and the dissent's conclusion that such punishment is clearly
constitutional. Instead, Justice O'Connor declared that because no
state death penalty statute expressly permits the execution of juve-
nile killers under age sixteen, juveniles under that age are not pres-
ently eligible for death sentences. However, the opinion paves the
way for states to re-examine their death penalty statutes and ex-
pressly amend them to include persons under the age of sixteen.3
Thus, while Thompson spares the lives of William Wayne Thompson
and two other fifteen-year-old juveniles,4 it does not ensure the pro-
hibition of such future executions.
This note seeks to accomplish three objectives. First, it briefly out-
lines the history of recent judicial decisions concerning capital pun-
ishment, including those involving juveniles.5 Second, the note
carefully analyzes the Thompson plurality, concurring, and dissenting
1. L.A. Times, June 19, 1988, at 2, col. 1.
2. 108 S. Ct. 2687 (1988) (Stevens, J., plurality). Justice Stevens, who was joined
by Justices Brennan, Marshall, and Blackmun, delivered the plurality opinion. Justice
O'Connor delivered the only concurring opinion. Justice Scalia, joined by Chief Jus-
tice Rehnquist and Justice White, delivered the dissenting opinion. Justice Kennedy,
who joined the Court after the oral arguments in Thompson, took no part in the con-
sideration of the case.
3. See inkfra notes 107-09 and accompanying text.
4. See infra note 111 and accompanying text.
5. See infra notes 8-46 and accompanying text.
opinions.6 Finally, it examines the present and future impact of
Thompson on juvenile executions, particularly in light of two pend-
ing Supreme Court cases concerning juvenile killers over the age of
fifteen and the addition of a new ninth Justice to the Supreme
Court.7
II. DEVELOPMENT OF JUDICIAL RESTRAINTS ON
CAPITAL PUNISHMENT
When the eighth amendments of the United States Constitution
was adopted, death by hanging was a common form of punishment
for many crimes.9 Nevertheless, in the 1960s, many people began to
question not only the purpose of capital punishment, but also
whether it violated the "cruel and unusual punishment" clause of the
eighth amendment.10 This sentiment prompted a line of Supreme
Court cases in the 1970s, first rejecting capital punishment, 1 then
reauthorizing it,12 and finally limiting its application to certain situa-
tions and crimes.13
In the landmark case of Furman v. Georgia,14 a sharply divided
Court held that the state death penalty statutes in effect at the time
violated the eighth and fourteenth amendments.5 Because the states
imposed capital punishment in an arbitrary, "wanton," and "freak-
ish" manner,16 focusing primarily on "outcasts of society" or "unpop-
ular groups,"17 the Court found that its imposition served no
6. See irfra notes 47-130 and accompanying text.
7. See infra notes 131-85 and accompanying text.
8. The eighth amendment provides: "Excessive bail shall not be required, nor ex-
cessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted." U.S. CONST.
amend. VIII (emphasis added).
9. H. BEDAU, THE DEATH PENALTY IN AMERICA 247 (3d ed. 1982) (referring to
Granucci, "Nor Cruel and Unusual Punishments Inflicted" The Original Meaning, 57
CALIF. L. REV. 839 (1969)).
10. Id. at 247-53.
11. See infra notes 14-20 and accompanying text.
12. See infra notes 22-24 and accompanying text.
13. See ivkfra notes 25-41 and accompanying text.
14. 408 U.S. 238 (1972) (per curiam). Furman constituted a 5-4 decision, in which
the majority concurred only in the judgment. Each of the Justices, whether concur-
ring or dissenting, wrote separate opinions.
15. Id. at 239-40. The eighth amendment is applied to the states through the incor-
poration doctrine of the fourteenth amendment. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1; see, e.g.,
Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660 (1962). But see generally R. BERGER, DEATH PEN-
ALTIES (1982) (theorizing that administration of the death penalty was reserved by the
Constitution to the states).
16. Furman, 408 U.S. at 310 (Stewart, J., concurring); see H. BEDAU, supra note 9,
at 249.
17. Furman, 408 U.S. at 245 (Douglas, J., concurring). Although the Court did not
find conclusively that the Furman defendants were sentenced to death just because
they were black, it noted that the unfettered discretion given courts and juries in se-
lecting the death penalty could "feed" prejudices against minorities, the poor, or per-
sons lacking social status. Id. at 255 (Douglas, J., concurring). In fact, the statistics
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legitimate social purpose18 and was therefore cruel and unusual pun-
ishment.19 However, the Court suggested that "evenhanded, non-
selective, and nonarbitrary" death penalty statutes would be
upheld.20
In the wake of Furman, thirty-five states rushed to enact new,
hopefully constitutional, death penalty legislation.2 1 After examining
one of these new statutes in Gregg v. Georgia,22 the Supreme Court
held that the imposition of the death penalty for murder is not a per
se violation of the eighth and fourteenth amendments.23 The Gregg
Court found that the Georgia statute adequately addressed Furman's
concerns by requiring the jury, among other things, to "find and
identify at least one statutory aggravating factor before impos[ing] a
penalty of death," and thus declared it constitutional. 24
However, after some states, such as North Carolina, attempted to
limit arbitrariness through mandatory death penalty statutes, 25 the
Court, citing the finality and uniqueness of capital punishment,
struck them down as unconstitutional in Woodson v. North Caro-
lina.2 6 The Woodson Court found that the "fundamental respect for
humanity underlying the Eighth Amendment... requires considera-
tion of the character and record of the individual offender and the
both before and after Furman reveal "that among equally guilty murderers, the death
penalty is more likely to be given to blacks than to whites, and to poor defendants
than to well-off ones." J. REIMAN, CHALLENGING CAPITAL PUNISHMENT 38-39 (K. Haas
& J. Inciardi ed. 1988).
18. The Court was specifically referring to the death penalty's failure to promote
the societal goals of retribution and deterrence. Furman, 408 U.S. at 311-12 (White, J.,
concurring); see also infra notes 94-99 and accompanying text.
19. Furman, 408 U.S. at 311-12 (White, J., concurring).
20. Id. at 256 (Douglas, J., concurring).
21. H. BEDAU, supra note 9, at 250. In fact, 500 persons were once again on death
row by 1976. Id.
22. 428 U.S. 153 (1976).
23. Id. at 206-07.
24. Id at 206. On the same date the Gregg decision was issued, the Court also up-
held the Texas death penalty statute in Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262, 276 (1976), as well
as the Florida statute in Proffitt v. Florida, 428 U.S. 242, 259-60 (1976). The rulings
indicated the Court's willingness to uphold statutes which provide for:
(1) opportunity to put before the court information about the defendant to as-
sist it in reaching the sentencing decision, (2) special emphasis on any mitigat-
ing factors that affect the defendant's blameworthiness, (3) common standards
to guide trial courts in their sentencing decisions, and (4) review of every
death sentence by a state appellate court.
H. BEDAU, supra note 9, at 251.
25. Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280 (1976).
26. I& at 305; see Roberts v. Louisiana, 431 U.S. 633, 636-37 (1977) (holding that it
is unconstitutional to limit the death penalty to certain types of victims, such as police
officers).
circumstances of the particular offense."2 7 In Coker v. Georgia,28 the
Court held that the death penalty is prohibited in rape cases because
it is grossly disproportionate to the crime.29 Once again, the Court
noted that because the death penalty "is unique in its severity and ir-
revocability," it must be treated differently than other types of
punishment.3 0
The Supreme Court in Enmund v. Floridas3 ruled that the focus in
death penalty cases should be on the individual offenders and their
culpability for the crimes committed, not on the acts themselves or
their subsequent consequences.3 2 Thus, the Court refused to uphold
the death penalty in felony-murder cases wherein a defendant does
not kill, attempt to kill, or intend to kill the victim. Specifically, the
offender must be "as culpable as others receiving the same punish-
ment for a similar crime." 33
In the 1978 companion cases of Lockett v. Ohio 34 and Bell v. Ohio,35
the Supreme Court held that sentencing juries and judges must con-
sider all mitigating factors offered by the defendant, including the de-
fendant's age.3 6 In Bell, the defendant was not allowed to present his
youth as a mitigating factor and was thereafter sentenced to death
for a crime he committed at the age of sixteen. Because the Ohio
statute narrowly limited the introduction of mitigating circum-
stances, the Court reversed the defendant's death sentence.3 7
In 1982, the Supreme Court, in Eddings v. Oklahoma,3 8 finally
agreed to consider the constitutionality of the death penalty as ap-
plied to a sixteen-year-old offender.3 9 However, the Court ultimately
27. Woodson, 428 U.S. at 304.
28. 433 U.S. 584 (1977).
29. Id. at 592.
30. Id. at 598 (quoting Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 187 (1976)); see Eberheart v.
Georgia, 232 Ga. 247, 206 S.E.2d 12, vacated mem., 433 U.S. 917 (1977) (Supreme Court
vacated judgment applying the death penalty to a kidnapping case). In Woodson, the
Court emphasized the gravity of the death penalty: "Death, in its finality, differs more
from life imprisonment than a 100-year prison term differs from one of only a year or
two." 428 U.S. at 305; see also H. BEDAU, sup'ra note 9, at 251-52.
31. 458 U.S. 782 (1982).
32. Id. at 798 (quoting Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 605 (1978)); see Note, The De-
cency of Capital Punishment for Minors: Contemporary Standards and the Dignity of
Juveniles, 61 IND. L.J. 757, 764 n.40 (1986).
33. Id. at 764; see Enmund, 458 U.S. at 798. Enmund's only role in the crime was
as driver of the get-away car. He was not present at the scene of the murders and did
not intend for anyone to get hurt. Id. at 788.
34. 438 U.S. 586 (1978).
35. 438 U.S. 637 (1978).
36. Lockett, 438 U.S. at 608; Bell, 438 U.S. at 642-43; see V. STREIB, DEATH PENALTY
FOR JUVENILES 21-22 (1987).
37. Bell, 438 U.S. at 642-43.
38. 455 U.S. 104 (1982).
39. Prior to Eddings, many states considered whether certain punishments violate
the Constitution when applied to juveniles. For example, in Workman v. Common-
wealth, 429 S.W.2d 374, 378 (Ky. 1968), the court held that sentencing a 14-year-old to
[Vol. 16: 737, 1989] Thompson v. Oklahoma
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chose not to address the constitutional issue,40 voting instead to re-
mand the case for resentencing in accordance with the standards pre-
viously announced in Lockett and Bell.41
Unfortunately, subsequent state court decisions failed to take a
consistent view of the Eddings decision. Some states interpreted Ed-
dings as holding that the death penalty for juveniles is not per se
cruel and unusual punishment.42 Others, after recognizing that Ed-
dings did not address the constitutionality of the death penalty for
juveniles, proceeded to decide the issue themselves. 43 Another group
of states chose to leave the constitutional issue undecided,44 while yet
a fourth group interpreted Eddings as giving a defendant's youth
compelling mitigating weight in death penalty cases.45 Amidst this
confusion, the Supreme Court granted certiorari in Thompson to con-
sider the constitutionality of juvenile executions.46
life imprisonment constituted cruel and unusual punishment. See V. STREiB, supra
note 36, at 47-48.
40. Eddings, 455 U.S. at 116-17. However, the four dissenting Justices-Chief Jus-
tice Burger and Justices Blackmun, Rehnquist, and White-found that no constitu-
tional bar exists to the application of the death penalty to 16-year-01ds. and would have
upheld Eddings' death sentence on constitutional grounds. Eddings, 455 U.S. at 128
(Burger, C.J., dissenting).
41. Id. at 117. Although Eddings' youth was considered as a mitigating factor, the
trial court refused to consider, as a matter of law, Eddings' troubled background, in-
cluding the fact that he was a victim of child abuse. Ici at 115-16.
42. See, e.g., High v. Zant, 250 Ga. 693, 300 S.E.2d 654 (1983), cert. granted, 108 S.
Ct. 2896 (1988). The decisions in High and similar cases, however, directly contravene
Justice O'Connor's own view of Eddings: "I, however, do not read the Court's opinion
... as deciding the issue of whether the Constitution permits imposition of the death
penalty on an individual who committed a murder at age 16." Eddings, 455 U.S. at 119
(O'Connor, J., concurring).
43. See Thompson v. State, 724 P.2d 780, 784 (Okla. Crim. App. 1986) (adopting the
court's pre-Eddings determination that the execution of a minor certified to be tried as
an adult does not constitute cruel and unusual punishment); see also Prejean v. Black-
burn, 570 F. Supp. 985 (W.D. La. 1983), qff'd, 743 F.2d 1091 (5th Cir. 1984) (holding
that the 17-year-old defendant's constitutional claim is "without merit"); Trimble v.
State, 300 Md. 387, 478 A.2d 1143 (1984) (noting that although the death penalty for a
17-year-old is not prohibited by the eighth amendment, cases involving juveniles
should be considered on an individual basis).
44. See, e.g., Cannaday v. State, 455 So. 2d 713 (Miss. 1984) (finding that the deter-
mination of the constitutionality of a juvenile's death sentence should be expressly
avoided).
45. See, e.g., State v. Valencia, 132 Ariz. 248, 645 P.2d 239 (1982). Although the Va-
lencia court did not rule out the death penalty for juveniles, it found that age was "a
substantial and relevant factor which must be given great weight." Id. at 250, 645 P.2d
at 241.
46. See Thompson v. State, 724 P.2d 780 (Okla. Crim. App. 1986), cert. granted, 479
U.S. 1084 (1987) (certiorari was granted on February 23, 1987).
III. STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Just six weeks before his sixteenth birthday,47 William Wayne
Thompson and three older individuals brutally killed Thompson's
former brother-in-law, Charles Keene. Apparently provoked by
Keene's physical abuse of Thompson's sister, Thompson told his girl-
friend on January 22, 1983, that he and his friends were "going to kill
Charles."48 A few hours later, on January 23, Malcolm "Possum"
Brown, Thompson's neighbor, heard a gunshot outside his house and
someone knocking on his door. He then heard someone yell, "Pos-
sum, open the door, let me in. They're going to kill me."49 After
calling the authorities, Brown looked outside his door and saw five
men on his porch. Three of the men were attacking a kneeling man,
while the other man, who was carrying a gun, looked on. When
Brown returned to the telephone to answer a call from the police,
the men departed with the victim.5 0
In the ensuing days, Thompson admitted to several people, includ-
ing his girlfriend and his mother, that he and the others had killed
Charles Keene. On February 18, 1983, almost a month after the mur-
der, Oklahoma officials discovered Keene's body in a nearby river.
The medical evidence revealed that Keene had been "beaten, shot
twice, and that his throat, chest, and abdomen had been cut."51
After Thompson was charged with Keene's murder, the state pros-
ecutor sought to have him tried as an adult,5 2 even though Thompson
was considered a "child" under Oklahoma law.53 In granting the
prosecutor's request, the trial court noted "that there [were] virtually
no reasonable prospects for rehabilitation of [Thompson] within the
juvenile system and that [he] should be held accountable for his acts
as if he were an adult and should be certified to stand trial as an
adult." 4 Subsequently, Thompson was convicted of first-degree mur-
47. Reidinger, Fate of the Teenage Killers, A.B.A. J., Oct. 1, 1987, at 89.
48. Thompson v. Oklahoma, 108 S. Ct. 2687, 2712 (1988) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
Justice Scalia significantly elaborated on the facts in his dissenting opinion in order to
aid in further understanding the case.
49. Id (Scalia, J., dissenting).
50, Id, (Scalia, J., dissenting).
51. Id. at 2712-13 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
52. OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, § 1112(b) (West 1987 & Supp. 1989). Under this stat-
ute, the court may permit a child to be tried for a felony as an adult if the case has
prosecutive merit, and there appears to be no "prospects for reasonable rehabilitation
of the child" within the juvenile courts. Id.; see Thompson, 108 S. Ct. at 2713 (Scalia,
J., dissenting).
53. OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, § 1101(1) (West 1987 & Supp. 1989). A child is "any
person under eighteen (18) years of age, except for any person sixteen (16) or seven-
teen (17) years of age who is charged with murder." Id.; see Thompson, 108 S. Ct. at
2690 n.2 (Stevens, J., plurality).
54. Thompson, 108 S. Ct. at 2690 (Stevens, J., plurality) (emphasis in original).
The trial court partially based this finding on the testimony of a clinical psychologist,
who explained that "Thompson understood the difference between right and wrong
[Vol. 16: 737, 1989] Thompson v. Oklahoma
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der and sentenced to death. All three of his accomplices, who were
tried separately, met the same fate.55
During the guilt phase of Thompson's trial, the prosecutor prof-
fered three color photographs depicting the condition of Keene's
body as it was pulled from the water. On appeal, the court found
that the admission of two of the photographs was improper, but held
that the error was "harmless" in light of the strong case against
Thompson. However, the court did not rule on whether the prosecu-
tor's use of the photographs during closing argument was
erroneous.56
During the sentencing phase, the jury found one of the two aggra-
vating circumstances requested by the prosecution-that the murder
was "especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel."5 7 Although the court al-
lowed Thompson to submit his youth as a mitigating factor,58 the jury
sentenced Thompson to death.5 9 The criminal court of appeals subse-
quently upheld Thompson's death sentence, noting that once a juve-
nile is "certified to stand trial as an adult, he may also, without
violating the Constitution, be punished as an adult."60 Thompson
then appealed his conviction and sentence to the United States
Supreme Court, which granted certiorari.6 1
but had an antisocial personality that could not be modified by the juvenile justice sys-
tem." Id at 2713 (Scalia, J., dissenting). The psychologist further testified that
"Thompson believed that because of his age he was beyond any severe penalty of the
law . . .and [that] there would be [no] severe repercussions from his behavior." Id.
(Scalia, J., dissenting). The court also considered the testimony of an Oklahoma juve-
nile justice system employee who recommended that Thompson be held accountable
for Keene's murder as an adult. Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting). After describing her con-
tacts with Thompson concerning his prior arrests for assault and battery in 1980, 1981,
and 1982, attempted burglary in 1982, and assault with a deadly weapon in 1983, the
employee testified that Thompson had been given "all the counseling the State's De-
partment of Human Services had available," but that none had "seemed to improve his
behavior." Id (Scalia, J., dissenting).
55. Id at 2690 (Stevens, J., plurality).
56. Id. (Stevens, J., plurality).
57. Id. (Stevens, J., plurality). The jury did not find the requested second aggra-
vating circumstance: "that there was a probability that the defendant would commit
criminal acts of violence that would constitute a continuing threat to society." Id, (Ste-
vens, J., plurality). This finding suggests that Thompson could be successfully rehabil-
itated. See Brief for Petitioner, Thompson v. Oklahoma, 108 S. Ct. 2687 (1988) (No. 86-
6169).
58. Thompson, 108 S. Ct. at 2713 (Scalia, J., dissenting); see Eddings v. Oklahoma,
455 U.S. 104, 115-17 (1982) (noting that state courts must permit all relevant mitigating
evidence in death penalty cases).
59. Thompson, 108 S. Ct. at 2690 (Stevens, J., plurality).
60. Id. at 2690-91 (Stevens, J., plurality) (quoting Thompson v. State, 724 P.2d 780,
784 (Okla. Crim. App. 1986)).
61. See supra note 46.
IV. THE PLURALITY OPINION
The Supreme Court certified two issues for decision: first, whether
the execution of a fifteen-year-old individual constitutes cruel and
unusual punishment, in violation of the eighth and fourteenth
amendments;62 and second, whether the jury's consideration of the
inflammatory photographs of Keene's body during the sentencing
phase of Thompson's trial violated his constitutional rights.63 Be-
cause the plurality6 4 decided the former issue in favor of Thompson,
it did not reach the merits of the latter.6e
The plurality first noted that in order to determine whether a pun-
ishment is cruel and unusual,6 6 a court must consider the "evolving
standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing society." 67
The definition of cruel and unusual is meant to be flexible, con-
forming to society's present opinions of decency. Due to this need for
flexibility, the plurality reviewed relevant state statutes, 68 recent
jury determinations,69 and present sociological views concerning the
culpability of minors 70 to determine the nation's attitude toward exe-
cuting fifteen-year-old offenders.71 Based upon the extensive data it
gathered, the plurality found that such executions are abhorrent to
today's society and therefore unconstitutional. 72
A. State Statutory Authority
In examining state statutory authority, the plurality found over-
whelming evidence that states are not willing to treat minors as
adults. For example, no state, nor the District of Columbia, allows a
person under the age of eighteen to vote or to sit on a jury.73 Only
one state permits a fifteen-year-old to drive without parental con-
sent,7 4 and only four states allow a fifteen-year-old to marry without
62. Thompson, 108 S. Ct. at 2691 (Stevens, J., plurality); see supra notes 8, 15.
63. Thompson, 108'S. Ct. at 2691 (Stevens, J., plurality).
64. Justice Stevens wrote the plurality opinion, which was joined by Justices
Brennan, Marshall, and Blackmun.
65. Id, at 2700 n.48 (Stevens, J., plurality).
66. See supra note 8.
67. Thompson, 108 S. Ct. at 2691 (Stevens, J., plurality) (quoting Trop v. Dulles,
356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958)). Factors to be considered in determining "evolving standards of
decency" are the history of the punishment, current statutory law, jury verdicts, and
international opinion. Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782, 788 (1982).
68. See infra notes 73-88 and accompanying text.
69. See infra notes 89-93 and accompanying text.
70. See infra notes 94-99 and accompanying text.
71. Thompson, 108 S. Ct. at 2691-92 (Stevens, J., plurality).
72. Id. at 2700 (Stevens, J., plurality).
73. Id. at 2693 app. at 2701-02 (Stevens, J., plurality).
74. Id. at 2693 app. at 2702-03 (Stevens, J., plurality). In Montana, a 15-year-old
may operate a motor vehicle without parental consent upon the successful completion
of a driver's education class. MONT. CODE ANN. § 61-5-105 (1987).
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parental consent.75 Similarly, all states, except one, prohibit fifteen-
year-olds from purchasing pornographic items,76 and among the
forty-two states allowing legalized forms of gambling, only six lack
any age limit restrictions.77 Furthermore, in Oklahoma, where
Thompson's trial took place, a minor is prohibited from: purchasing
alcohol 78 or cigarettes;79 attending a bingo parlor or pool hall without
an adult;80 pawning property;8 1 obtaining medical services, unless
married, emancipated, or suffering from a life threatening injury;8 2
and from working at a shooting gallery.83 The plurality further
found that such statutes strongly suggest the states' consensus that
"[m]ost children, even in adolescence, simply are not able to make
sound judgments concerning many decisions."8 4
More importantly, the plurality noted that of the thirty-seven
states authorizing capital punishment, eighteen states expressly limit
such punishment to persons age sixteen or older at the time they
committed their crime.8 5 The plurality also expressed its concern
75. Thompson, 108 S. Ct. at 2693 app. at 2703-04 (Stevens, J., plurality). Four
states authorize the waiver of parental consent to marry in some instances: Alaska,
Louisiana, Maryland, and Mississippi. See ALASKA STAT. § 25.05.171 (1983); LA. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 9:211 (West Supp. 1988) (suggesting that although minors may marry,
sanctions may be imposed against officials); MD. FAM. LAW CODE ANN. § 2-301 (1984)
(woman must either be pregnant or have had a child to obviate parental consent);
MISS. CODE ANN. § 93-1-5(d) (Supp. 1987) (applies only to females).
76. Thompson, 108 S. Ct at 2693 app. at 2704-05 (Stevens, J., plurality). Alaska is
the only state having no legislation concerning the rights of minors to purchase porno-
graphic materials.
77. 1& at 2693 app. at 2705-06. The six states having no statutory age restrictions
on gambling are Kentucky, Maryland, Minnesota, New Mexico, North Carolina, and
Virginia. In addition, the following states only permit such gambling with parental
consent: Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, and Texas. See OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 995.13
(West 1983); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 10 § 305 (Purdon Supp. 1987); TEx. REV. CIV. STAT.
ANN. art. 179d, § 17 (Vernon Supp. 1988).
Citing the Nevada law prohibiting gambling by persons under the age of 21, NEV.
REV. STAT. § 463.350 (1986), a Nevada casino recently refused to pay out a $1,061,812
jackpot won by a 19-year-old who was playing the slot machines in the company of his
parents. Shearer, Intelligence Report, PARADE, Oct. 30, 1988, at 16. Ironically, Nevada
law expressly permits persons 16 or older to be executed. NEV. REV. STAT. § 176.025
(1986).
78. OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 1215 (West 1983).
79. Id § 1241 (Supp. 1988).
80. Id, §§ 995.13, 1103 (1983).
81. OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 59, § 1511(C)(1) (West Supp. 1988).
82. OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 63, §§ 2601(a), 2602 (West 1984 & Supp. 1988).
83. Id. § 703 (1984).
84. Thompson v. Oklahoma, 108 S. Ct. 2687, 2693 n.23 (1988) (Stevens, J., plurality)
(quoting Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584, 603 (1979)).
85. Id at 2695-96 (Stevens, J., plurality). The 18 states that set age limits on ex-
ecutions are California (age 18), Colorado (age 18), Connecticut (age 18), Georgia (age
that nineteen states have not established any age limit, thus sug-
gesting that "current standards of decency would still tolerate the ex-
ecution of 10-year-old children."8 6 It also found that the nineteen
pertinent statutes were not accurate indicators of the states' position
on capital punishment since they do not "focus on the question of
where the chronological age line should be drawn."87 Instead, the
plurality found that the eighteen state statutes establishing minimum
death penalty age limits at sixteen, combined with the positions of
various organizations and foreign countries against the death penalty
for juveniles, logically lead to the conclusion that executing a fifteen-
year-old would "offend civilized standards of decency."88
B. Jury Behavior
After examining jury behavior throughout this century, the plural-
ity concluded that the general lack of executions of fifteen-year-olds
"unambiguously" evidences the nation's attitude against such execu-
tions.8 9 In support of this conclusion, the plurality noted that only
eighteen to twenty persons who committed capital crimes under the
age of sixteen have ever been executed, with the last such execution
17), Illinois (age 18), Indiana (age 16), Kentucky (age 16), Maryland (age 18), Nebraska
(age 18), Nevada (age 16), New Hampshire (age 18), New Jersey (age 18), New Mexico
(age 18), North Carolina (age 17), Ohio (age 18), Oregon (age 18), Tennessee (age 18),
and Texas (age 17). I& at 2696 n.30 (Stevens, J., plurality).
86. The following states have not established an express minimum age for death
eligibility: Alabama, Arizona, Arkansas, Delaware, Florida, Idaho, Louisiana, Missis-
sippi, Missouri, Montana, Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, South Carolina, South Dakota,
Utah, Vermont, Virginia, Washington, and Wyoming. However, neither Vermont nor
South Dakota has issued a post-Furman death sentence. Id, at 2695 n.26 (Stevens, J.,
plurality). Additionally, the Vermont statute is considered to be invalid. H. BEDAU,
supra note 9, at 34 comment g. The federal government also has no minimum age
limit for imposing the death penalty. Thompson, 108 S. Ct. at 2707-08 (O'Connor, J.,
concurring).
87. Id at 2695 (Stevens, J., plurality).
88. Id at 2696 (Stevens, J., plurality). The plurality noted that both the American
Bar Association and the American Law Institute oppose the execution of juveniles and
that most foreign countries have either abolished capital punishment or allow it only
in exceptional circumstances. Id, (Stevens, J., plurality). Amnesty International re-
ported that, in addition to the United States, only Pakistan, Bangladesh, Barbados,
Rwanda, and possibly Iran permit juvenile executions. Brief of Amicus Curiae Am-
nesty International in Support of Petitioner at 23-24, Thompson v. Oklahoma, 108 S.
Ct. 2687 (1988) (No. 86-6169). Furthermore, of the 11,000 documented executions
throughout the world since 1979, only eight were for crimes committed by persons
under the age of 18. Brief of Petitioner at 27, Thompson v. Oklahoma, 108 S. Ct. 2687
(1988) (No. 86-6169). However, the dissent found that the plurality's reliance on the
practices of foreign governments was "totally inappropriate as a means of establishing
the fundamental beliefs of this nation." Thompson, 108 S. Ct. at 2716 n.4 (Scalia, J.,
dissenting).
89. Thompson, 108 S. Ct. at 2697 (Stevens, J., plurality); see Furman v. Georgia,
408 U.S. 238, 249 (1972) (noting that the rarity of a penalty may signify its arbitrary
nature).
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occurring in 1948.90 Furthermore, of the 1861 persons convicted of
criminal homicide between 1982 and 1986 for murders committed
while under the age of sixteen, only five (or 0.3%), including Thomp-
son, received death sentences. 91 Contrasting this data with the fact
that of 82,094 offenders over the age of sixteen, 1388 (or 1.7%) re-
ceived the death penalty,92 the plurality concluded that the five
young offenders received "sentences that [were] 'cruel and unusual in
the same way that being struck by lightning is cruel and unusual.' '93
C. Present Sociological Views Concerning the Culpability
of Minors
Recognizing the social purposes behind the death penalty as retri-
bution and "deterrence of capital crimes by prospective offenders,"94
the plurality considered whether the execution of fifteen-year-old of-
fenders would promote these goals. First, the plurality noted that
the Supreme Court has repeatedly recognized that children's acts are
less culpable than those of adults because children generally are "less
mature and responsible than adults,"95 and have "less capacity to
90. Thompson, 108 S. Ct. at 2697 (Stevens, J., plurality); see V. STREIB, supra note
36, at 190-208 (1987). However, since 1985, three men who committed capital crimes at
age 17 have been executed. Id at 121-29. For a discussion of two of these executions,
see irnfra notes 152-53, 160-62 and accompanying text.
91. Thompson, 108 S. Ct. at 2697 nn.38-39 (Stevens, J., plurality). Even before
Furman, in 1972, the number of juvenile executions in the United States had exper-
ienced a marked decline. Of the estimated 230 juvenile executions since 1880, all but
six occurred before 1960. R. REIMAN, supra note 17, at 257-63. Of those six, three oc-
curred in the 1960s (pre-Furman) and three in the 1980s (more than ten years after
Furman). Id,
Furthermore, although approximately 88 juvenile offenders were sentenced to death
between 1972 and March 31, 1987, only 33 remained on death row as of March 31, 1987.
Id. State courts only imposed eleven such sentences in 1982, nine in 1983, six in 1984,
four in 1985, seven in 1986, and one in early 1987. Id Of these 38 sentences, all but 5
involved 16- or 17-year-old offenders and only 2 involved females. Id.
92. Thompson, 108 S. Ct. at 2697 nn.38-39 (Stevens, J., plurality).
93. Id. at 2697-98 (Stevens, J., plurality) (quoting Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238,
309 (1972) (Stewart, J., concurring)). In Furman, Justice Stewart analogized the ran-
dom application of capital punishment to the likelihood of being "struck by lightning."
408 U.S. at 309-10 (Stewart, J., concurring). Apparently, Justice Stewart was con-
cerned that persons receiving death sentences could not be distinguished from those
persons committing similar crimes, but receiving lighter punishments. E. BLocK,
WHEN MEN PLAY GOD 15 (1983).
94. Thompson, 108 S. Ct. at 2699 (Stevens, J., plurality) (quoting Gregg v. Georgia,
428 U.S. 153, 183 (1976)).
95. Id at 2698 (Stevens, J., plurality); see, e.g., Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104,
115-16 (1982). The plurality specifically noted that "[ilnexperience, less education, and
less intelligence make the teenager less able to evaluate the consequences of his or her
conduct... [and that] he or she is much more apt to be motivated by mere emotion or
control their conduct and to think in long-range terms."9 6 Accord-
ingly, given the juvenile's reduced culpability and capacity for
growth, combined with society's recognized fiduciary duties toward
minors, the plurality found the retributive value in executing fifteen-
year-old criminals to be almost nonexistent. 97
Second, the plurality found capital punishment's goal of deterrence
similarly lacking when applied to fifteen-year-old offenders. Even as-
suming that the death penalty serves as a deterrent to older offend-
ers, the plurality noted that "[t]he likelihood that the teenage
offender has made the kind of cost-benefit analysis that attaches any
weight to the possibility of execution is so remote as to be virtually
nonexistent. s9 8 The plurality also noted that because executions of
minors are so rare, a minor is unlikely, in any event, to consider such
a consequence. 99
After finding that the purposes behind capital punishment are de-
feated when applied to persons fifteen years of age or younger, the
plurality held that such punishment is "nothing more than the pur-
poseless and needless imposition of pain and suffering," and thus pro-
hibited by the eighth and fourteenth amendments. 00
V. JUSTICE O'CONNOR'S CONCURRING OPINION
Justice O'Connor's concurring opinion agreed with both the plural-
ity and the dissent that capital punishment should be accorded a min-
imum age limit and that the Court in determining such an age, must
be governed by "evolving standards of decency that mark the pro-
gress of a maturing society."101 However, the concurrence did not be-
lieve that the empirical evidence available to the Court conclusively
established a national consensus prohibiting the execution of persons
committing capital crimes while under the age of sixteen. 0 2 Never-
theless, because it could find no basis for executing a person under
peer pressure than is an adult." Thompson, 108 S. Ct. at 2699 (Stevens, J., plurality).
Also, the plurality reiterated the general agreement "that punishment should be di-
rectly related to the personal culpability of the criminal defendant." Id. at 2698 (Ste-
vens, J., plurality) (quoting California v. Brown, 479 U.S. 538, 545 (1987) (O'Connor, J.,
concurring)).
96. Thompson, 108 S. Ct. at 2699 (Stevens, J., plurality) (quoting Eddings, 455 U.S.
at 115).
97. Id at 2699 (Stevens, J., plurality).
98. Id at 2700 (Stevens, J., plurality); see V. STREIB, supra note 36, at 36-37 (recog-
nizing that minors live "primarily for today" without much thought for the future).
99. Thompson, 108 S. Ct. at 2700 (Stevens, J., plurality).
100. Id, (Stevens, J., plurality) (quoting Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 592 (1977)).
Although the Court was asked to "draw a line" at age 18, the plurality refused to de-
cide any issue beyond the one presented. Id (Stevens, J., plurality).
101. Id. at 2706 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (quoting Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101
(1958)).
102. Id. (O'Connor, J., concurring).
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age sixteen without the express authorization of state law, the con-
currence ultimately agreed with the judgment of the plurality revers-
ing Thompson's death sentence.1 03
The concurrence primarily relied on two factors. First, ik noted
that every state legislature establishing a minimum age for death eli-
gibility has set that age at sixteen or older. In fact, the concurrence
pointed out that almost two-thirds of the states have "definitely con-
cluded that no 15-year-old should be exposed to the threat of execu-
tion."10 4  Second, the concurrence emphasized the fact that no
evidence exists showing that the Oklahoma Legislature, or any other
legislature for that matter, carefully considered the potential conflict
between its statute authorizing capital punishment and its statute
permitting juveniles to be prosecuted as adults. Without such evi-
dence, the concurrence was unwilling to find that the Oklahoma Leg-
islature had provided for the execution of persons under sixteen.1 05
Despite this evidence, the concurrence stopped short of finding a
national consensus. Instead, Justice O'Connor noted that because
nineteen states and the federal government have adopted statutes
which, without an express minimum age, theoretically allow for ex-
ecutions of persons under sixteen, a real obstacle stands in the way of
concluding that society completely rejects such a practice.' 06 In fact,
the concurrence commented, with the benefit of hindsight, that if the
Supreme Court had accepted similar evidence as the national consen-
sus when considering the constitutionality of capital punishment in
Furman, the Court clearly would have been wrong.J07
Because the concurrence was unwilling "to substitute [the Court's]
inevitably subjective judgment about the best age at which to draw a
line in the capital punishment context for the judgments of the na-
tion's legislatures,"os it found both that the matter should be left to
the individual states to determine and that the Court should avoid
making a broader, unnecessary constitutional decision at this time. 09
The concurrence also held that since the evidence suggests that age
103. Ic& (O'Connor, J., concurring).
104. Id. (O'Connor, J., concurring); see supra notes 85-87 and accompanying text.
105. The lack of evidence supporting the legislature's consideration of this conflict
suggests the lack of "special care and deliberation" required by the Supreme Court in
death penalty cases. Thompson, 108 S. Ct. at 2707-10 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
106. 1& at 2708 (O'Connor, J., concurring); see supra note 86 and accompanying
text.
107. Thompson, 108 S. Ct. at 2709 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
108. Id. (O'Connor, J., concurring).
109. I& at 2711 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
sixteen is an appropriate line, any death penalty statute not affording
a minimum age shall be presumed to have drawn that line at a mini-
mum age of sixteen.11o Accordingly, because Oklahoma law estab-
lished no minimum age for death penalty eligibility, the decision of
the concurrence, combined with the judgment of the plurality, va-
cated Thompson's sentence and removed him from death row."'1
VI. THE DISSENTING OPINION
While recognizing that the eighth amendment does establish a min-
imum age for death eligibility, the dissent"1 2 found no plausible basis
for establishing sixteen as that age. The dissent noted that
Oklahoma and eighteen other states which provide no minimum age
for executions carefully consider the facts of the case, the seriousness
of the crime, and the juvenile's prospect for rehabilitation within the
juvenile system before holding a minor eligible to be tried as an
adult.113 The dissent, after stressing the heinousness of Keene's mur-
der, emphatically rejected the judgment of the plurality and the con-
currence and held that Thompson's death sentence should stand.114
The dissent first cautioned that the Court should refrain from im-
posing its own views when examining the evolving standards of de-
cency which define the present interpretation of cruel and unusual
punishment."15 Further, it suggested the Court should be guided
solely by objective factors, such as legislation enacted by the states'
elected representatives.116 Notwithstanding the plurality's examina-
tion of a number of state statutes,"17 the dissent concluded that the
110. Id, (O'Connor, J., concurring). Interestingly, the concurrence does not men-
tion that 19 states filed an amici curiae brief on behalf of the State of Oklahoma. The
19 states consisted of 13 states which have not established a minimum age for death
eligibility (Alabama, Arizona, Delaware, Florida, Idaho, Mississippi, Missouri, Mon-
tana, Pennsylvania, South Carolina, Utah, Virginia, and Wyoming); 5 states which have
established a minimum between ages 16 and 18 (Connecticut, Kentucky, Nevada, New
Mexico, and North Carolina); and one state which has no statute authorizing the death
penalty (Kansas). See supra notes 85-87 and accompanying text. In their brief, the
states urged that they should be allowed to determine the appropriate punishment on
an "individualized, case-by-case basis" and to "punish capital offenders consistently, ac-
cording to the defendants' relative degree of culpability rather than simply by their
birthdate." Brief of Amici 'Curiae for Respondent Oklahoma at 1-2, Thompson v.
Oklahoma, 108 S. Ct. 2687 (1988) (No. 86-6169). This brief strongly suggests that sev-
eral states may respond to the concurrence's decision and establish minimum age lim-
its under the age of 16.
111. This decision reportedly removes from death row two other individuals who
were under 16 at the time of their crimes. N.Y. Times, June 30, 1988, at 17, col. 1.
112. The dissenting opinion was written by Justice Scalia and joined by Chief Jus-
tice Rehnquist and Justice White.
113. Thompson, 108 S. Ct. at 2712 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
114. Id. at 2711-21 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
115. Id. at 2714-15 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
116. Id. at 2715 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
117. See supra notes 73-88 and accompanying text.
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plurality's skewed analysis of those statutes suggests that it improp-
erly abandoned its judicial role in favor of a more legislative one.118
As did the concurrence, 119 the dissent also pointed out that a na-
tional consensus against the imposition of death sentences for per-
sons under sixteen is obviously impossible when nearly forty percent
of the states and the federal government clearly authorize such a
practice.120 Furthermore, the dissent theorized that the comparative
rarity of these sentences is nothing more than a reflection of society's
general unwillingness to impose the death penalty without "individu-
alized consideration."' 121 Since the number of adult executions have
dwindled considerably in the last several decades, the substantial re-
duction in executions of minors, including those aged sixteen and
seventeen, is neither surprising, nor an indication of a "modern con-
sensus that such [executions] should never occur."'122 Because
Thompson received the individualized consideration required by the
Supreme Court, including the opportunity to present his youth to the
jury as a mitigating factor, the dissent found that his death sentence,
although uncommon, was constitutionally permissible.123
After accusing the plurality of being improperly swayed by its own
"personal conscience,"124 the dissent expressed even less tolerance
for the views presented in the concurring opinion. First, it ques-
tioned the concurrence's logic in finding: (1) that a national consen-
sus is necessary to hold capital punishment unconstitutional as to
118. Thompson, 108 S. Ct. at 2718 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
119. See supra note 107 and accompanying text.
120. Thompson, 108 S. Ct. at 2716 (Scalia, J., dissenting). The dissent also discussed
state legislatures' recent trend toward lowering, instead of raising, the age of criminal
responsibility. Specifically, the dissent noted that Congress, in considering the Com-
prehensive Crime Control Act of 1984, lowered the age at which a juvenile can be pros-
ecuted as an adult in federal court from age 16 to 15. 18 U.S.C. § 5032 (Supp. V 1986).
In passing the legislation, Congress relied on Department of Justice testimony stating
that many juvenile delinquents are "cynical, street-wise, repeat offenders, indistin-
guishable, except for their age, from their adult criminal counterparts." Thompson,
108 S. Ct. at 2715 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (citing Hearings on S. 829 Before the Sub-
comm. on Criminal Law of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 98th Cong., 1st Sess.
551 (1983)).
121. Id. at 2718 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
122. Id. at 2717 (Scalia, J., dissenting). The dissent noted that executions of women
have experienced as impressive a drop as those of juveniles. Citing the fact that only
30 women were executed between 1930 and 1955, and only three between 1955 and
1986, the dissent commented that acceptance of the plurality's assertion that rarity of
executions is an accurate indicator of the national consensus would lead to the consti-
tutional prohibition of female executions-a conclusion the plurality surely is not urg-
ing. Id. at 2718 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
123. Id. at 2713-14 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
124. Id. at 2719 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
individuals under sixteen; and (2) that no such consensus exists, and
then concluding that a death penalty statute without a minimum age
limit is presumed to have a limit of sixteen.12 5 Second, while recog-
nizing the Court's historical protectiveness of a state's rights, the dis-
sent found that the concurrence does nothing more than tell states
such as Oklahoma: "We cannot really say that what you are doing is
contrary to national consensus and therefore unconstitutional, but
since we are not entirely sure you must in the future legislate in the
manner that we say."1 2 6
Finally, the dissent noted the concurrence's narrow conclusion ac-
tually leaves the door wide open for persons to challenge capital pun-
ishment statutes which do not expressly include their societal group,
such as "those of extremely low intelligence, or those over 75."127
The dissent reasoned that the concurring opinion is actually no more
than a means of avoiding Thompson's death sentence without decid-
ing the real constitutional issue at hand, and stated that it "would
prefer... even the misdescription of what constitutes a national con-
sensus favored by the plurality."128
Having thus rejected Thompson's assertion that his sentence was
unconstitutional, the dissent addressed the merits of his second
claim-that the jury's consideration of two photographs of Keene's
body during the penalty phase denied Thompson his due process
rights. In dismissing this claim, the dissent first noted that the pho-
tographs were clearly probative of the aggravating circumstance that
the killing was "especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel."'129 The dis-
senting opinion then noted that, even if the pictures were inflam-
matory, the Court has never before ruled that the prejudicial nature
of "concededly relevant evidence" is unconstitutional.130
VII. IMPACT OF THE COURT'S DECISION
A. Present Impact on Juvenile Executions
"The morality of the death penalty is one of those recurring ques-
125. Id, at 2720 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
126. Id at 2721 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
127. Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting). However, the concurrence rebutted this criticism by
stating that no particular societal group would be able to successfully challenge a death
penalty statute without substantial evidence showing the existence of a national con-
sensus forbidding the execution of persons within that group; this fact being shown in
the present case concerning persons under the age of 16. Id at 2711 (O'Connor, J.,
concurring).
128. Id at 2721 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
129. Id at 2722 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
130. Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting); see Lisenba v. California, 314 U.S. 219, 227-28 (1941)
(holding that the fourteenth amendment does not require the Supreme Court to re-
view the propriety of a trial court's admission of evidence).
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tions that seems to have a life of its own."' 3 ' Because the death pen-
alty leaves no room for compromise, most people naturally develop
definite opinions concerning its propriety. Proponents argue that
capital punishment is necessary to save lives,' 3 2 while its opponents
assert that it needlessly takes lives.' 33 However, the debate loses
much of its luster when the lives of juveniles are involved, causing
even some of the death penalty's staunchest supporters to reconsider
their positions.134
In Thompson, the Supreme Court seized the opportunity to deter-
mine, once and for all, the constitutionality of the death penalty for
juvenile offenders under the age of sixteen. Unfortunately, because
the debate concerning capital punishment divides the Justices as
much as the public, the Court had to settle for Justice O'Connor's
Furman-like compromise.'3 5 While declaring executions of persons
under sixteen presently unconstitutional, Justice O'Connor paves the
way for states to amend their death penalty statutes to provide for
such executions.
Despite the Court's division on the constitutionality of juvenile ex-
ecutions, the Justices essentially agreed on three key legal factors.
First, they all agreed that an age limit does exist at which juvenile
executions are per se cruel and unusual punishment. 3 6 Second, the
Justices agreed that the Court must be guided by the "evolving [ob-
jective] standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing
society" in determining whether a particular punishment is cruel and
unusual in violation of the eighth amendment. 3 7 Lastly, the Justices
agreed that to uphold the death penalty, the legitimate social pur-
poses behind capital punishment-retribution and deterrence-must
be served,'3 8 and that "proportionality requires a nexus between the
punishment imposed and the defendant's blameworthiness.' 13 9
However, after deciding the applicable law, the Justices agreed on
131. S. NATHANSON, AN EYE FOR AN EYE? 131 (1987).
132. E. BLOCK, supra note 93, at 39-40.
133. Id.
134. V. STREIB, supra note 36, at 30-34. Recent polls have shown that Americans
generally disfavor capital punishment for juveniles who commit crimes while under
the age of 18. In 1986, for example, a poll of 509 persons in Connecticut revealed that
while 68% favored capital punishment, only 31% would uphold it for juveniles. Id
135. For a discussion of Furman, see supra notes 14-20 and accompanying text.
136. Thompson v. Oklahoma, 108 S. Ct. 2687, 2706 (1988) (O'Connor, J., concurring).
137. Id, (O'Connor, J., concurring) (quoting Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958)).
138. Id at 2699-2700 (Stevens, J., plurality), 2708-09 (O'Connor, J., concurring), 2719
(Scalia, J., dissenting).
139. Id. at 2708 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
little else, especially upon the interpretation of the presumably objec-
tive standards establishing the national consensus concerning juve-
nile executions. Although they reviewed essentially the same
empirical data on juveniles, including state statutes and the practices
of foreign countries, 140 the Justices came to three separate, and rea-
sonable, conclusions. For example, in support of its opinion that soci-
ety rejects the execution of persons under the age sixteen, the
plurality cited the fact that no state has established a minimum
death-eligible age below sixteen.' 41 Conversely, the dissent asserted
that because nineteen states with no minimum age limit theoretically
allow for executions of persons under age sixteen, no such consensus
exists.142 However, the concurrence's interpretation of the same data
led to the conclusion that although a consensus likely does exist, the
states should be permitted to resolve the ambiguities and decide the
issue themselves.143
Given the inconsistencies in the states' views on capital punish-
ment for juveniles, the Court's difficulty in finding a national consen-
sus is understandable. However, both the concurrence and the
dissent suggest that even if only one state decides to execute just one
fifteen-year-old offender, a national consensus could still exist, as
long as "individualized consideration" is given to the particular juve-
nile's case.'4 4
Even accepting this dubious view of a national consensus, both the
concurrence and the dissent neglected to consider its effect on the
goals of capital punishment--deterrence and retribution. As sug-
gested by the plurality, the occasional execution of a fifteen-year-old
is unlikely to deter other youths of similar age from committing capi-
tal crimes.145 In fact, the deterrence value in any case, whether adult
or juvenile, is greatly diminished by the fact that while those who are
put to death generally "deserve to die," not all those who "deserve to
die are executed."' 146 As long as society as a whole continues the ad-
140. See supra notes 73-88 and accompanying text.
141. See supra notes 85-88 and accompanying text.
142. See supra notes 120-21 and accompanying text.
143. See supra notes 108-09 and accompanying text.
144. Thompson, 108 S. Ct. at 2706-07 (O'Connor, J., concurring), 2717 (Scalia, J., dis-
senting). The dissent specifically noted that the rareness of juvenile executions con-
tributes nothing "to a modern consensus that such an execution should never occur
....." Id at 2717 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
145. Id, at 2700 (Stevens, J., plurality); see supra notes 94-99 and accompanying
text.
146. S. NATHANSON, supra note 131, at 60. The following analogy suggests why the
arbitrariness of the death penalty undermines its purpose as a deterrent:
I tell the students in my class that anyone who plagiarizes will fail the course.
Three students plagiarize papers, but I give only one a failing grade. The
other two, in describing their motivation, win my sympathy, and I give them
passing grades.
Id, Not only will future students not be deterred from plagiarism in the future, but
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mirable practice of giving juveniles lighter sentences because they
are juveniles, the occasional death sentence will not serve as a deter-
rent. Furthermore, substantial evidence demonstrates that the pros-
pect of death is unlikely to deter teens in any event.147
"Most social scientists [agree] that juveniles live primarily for to-
day with little thought of the future consequences of their ac-
tions."148 Furthermore, most children lack the "ability to engage in
mature moral judgments" until they leave school or reach adult-
hood.149 The Supreme Court has even recognized that "during the
formative years of childhood and adolescence, minors often lack the
experience, perspective, and judgment to recognize and avoid choices
that could be detrimental to them."15o Therefore, most juveniles are
unlikely to conduct a "cost-benefit analysis"1 51 before committing
crimes.
Case studies effectively illustrate this point. For example, shortly
before Charles F. Rumbaugh 5 2 was executed in 1985, he was asked if
he considered the death penalty prior to committing murder. He re-
sponded, "I was 17 years old when I committed the offense for which
I was sentenced to die, and I didn't even start thinking and caring
they will have an incentive to develop adequate motivations for the plagiarism. Id. at
60-62. In fact, Justice White appropriately noted in Furman that "seldom enforced
laws [are such] ineffective measures for controlling human conduct that the death pen-
alty, unless imposed with sufficient frequency, will make little contribution to deter-
ring those crines for which it may be exacted." Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 312
(1972) (White, J., concurring).
147. V. STREIB, supra note 36, at 36-37. The death penalty is alleged to serve as a
deterrent because it capitalizes on an individual's fear of death. However, for many
people, the risk of death does not equal certainty of death, as evidenced by mountain
climbers, race car drivers, and even cigarette smokers. For most juveniles, a fear of
death is almost nonexistent because their lives have only just begun. S. NATHANSON,
supra note 131, at 17-20. Furthermore, studies show that ages 12 to 15 are the critical
years for juvenile experimentation with "forbidden behavior," and that most youths
feel that nothing will happen to them for crimes which they commit while under the
age of 16. C. CARPENTER, B. GLASSNER, B. JOHNSON & J. LOUGHLIN, KIDS, DRUGS, AND
CRIME 211-16 (1988) [hereinafter C. CARPENTER]; see also K. MAGID & C. MCKELVEY,
HIGH RISK 27-35 (containing a profile on "kids who kill").
148. V. STREIB, supra note 36, at 36 (citing Kastenbaum, Time and Death in Adoles-
cence, in THE MEANING OF DEATH 99 (1959)).
149. I&; see C. CARPENTER, supra note 147, at 217 (noting that sophisticated moral
thinking is low in preadolescents and does not develop until the "end of adolescence").
150. V. STREIB, supra note 36, at 37 (quoting Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622, 635
(1979)).
151. Thompson v. Oklahoma, 108 S. Ct. 2687, 2700 (1988) (Stevens, J., plurality).
152. On April 7, 1976, Rumbaugh was convicted and sentenced to death for a mur-
der he committed in Texas at age 17. He was executed 10-1/2 years later at age 28. V.
STREIB, supra note 36, at 121-25.
about my life until I was at least 20."153 Similarly, William Wayne
Thompson, the defendant in this case, stated that he also did not con-
sider the death penalty before his crime and "that his only thoughts
then were of playing ball or just hanging around with his friends."154
Not only is the goal of deterrence doubtful in juvenile executions,
but such executions appear to have little or no retributive value, par-
ticularly for persons under the age of sixteen.1 55 In Enmund, the
Supreme Court determined that executions are dependent upon the
defendant's culpability, and that "a defendant's intention-and there-
fore his moral guilt-[are] critical 'to the degree of [his] criminal cul-
pability.' "156 Because juveniles lack the ability to consider the long-
term effects of their actions, they should be, and usually are, held
less culpable for their actions than adults committing the same
crimes. 157 As a result of this reduced culpability, children should re-
ceive "pity and treatment" 158 for their capital crimes, rather than the
electric chair. In fact, most Americans favoring capital punishment
see little societal value in executing juveniles.159
The execution of James Terry Roachl60 vividly illustrates this
point. While suffering from mental retardation and a personality dis-
order, the seventeen-year-old Roach and another individual brutally
murdered a young couple. Despite the fact that he had a mental age
of twelve at the time of his crime, Roach received the death penalty
and was executed nine years later.161 However, because of his im-
paired mental health, Roach barely understood the day before his ex-
ecution that he was about to die for his crime.162
153. Id. at 125 (quoting Nat'l Cath. Rep., Nov. 8, 1985, at 16, col. 1).
154. Id at 215 n.11.
155. In Furman, Justice White remarked that "when imposition of the penalty
reaches a certain degree of infrequency, it would be very doubtful that any existing
general need for retribution would be measurably satisfied." Furman v. Georgia, 408
U.S. 238, 311 (1972) (White, J., concurring).
156. Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782, 800 (1982) (quoting Mullaney v. Wilbur, 421
U.S. 684, 698 (1975)).
157. Thompson v. Oklahoma, 108 S. Ct. 2687, 2698-99 (1988) (Stevens, J., plurality).
The Court noted that juvenile courts operate on the premise that "criminal responsi-
bility is absent in . .. misbehaving children" and that children are less culpable for
their acts because they lack "the basis for adult criminal accountability-the exercise
of an unfettered free will." Id. at 2698-99 n.41 (Stevens, J., plurality) (quoting S. FOX,
THE JUVENILE COURT: ITS CONTEXT, PROBLEMS & OPPORTUNITIES 11-12 (1967)).
158. V. STREIB, supra note 36, at 35.
159. See supra note 134 and accompanying text.
160. V. STREIB, supra note 36, at 125-27.
161. Roach's execution went forward despite numerous court appeals, and requests
for clemency by Mother Theresa of India, former President Carter, and the Secretary-
General of the United Nations. Id. at 126.
162. Roach's attorney stated that "Terry lacked the capacity to think more than a
few hours ahead, let alone to the possibility of arrest and execution." Id. at 127. How-
ever, the Thompson decision leaves open the question of whether Roach's execution
would be constitutional if carried out today. See, e.g., Jones v. Mississippi, 517 So. 2d
1295 (Miss. 1987), vacated and remanded, 108 S. Ct. 2891 (1988). In Jones, the defend-
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In Furman, Justice White-a Thompson dissenter-stated that
when capital punishment ceases to further the purposes it serves, it
becomes "the pointless and needless extinction of life with only mar-
ginal contributions to any discernible social or public purposes." 63
As shown by the plurality, the capital punishment of juveniles under
the age of sixteen serves neither as an effective deterrent nor as a
tool for retribution, and is thus a "patently excessive and cruel and
unusual punishmeht violative of the Eighth Amendment."'16 4 How-
ever, despite the decision of the four plurality Justices declaring ex-
ecutions of persons under age sixteen per se unconstitutional, the
concurring opinion of one Justice is unmistakably the present state of
the law.
Justice O'Connor's concurring opinion prohibits the execution of
juvenile offenders who committed their crimes while under the age
of sixteen and were sentenced under presently existing death penalty
statutes. This affords states the opportunity to expressly amend
those statutes to include such offenders. Because some states will
likely take. advantage of this opportunity,16 5 Thompson, in retrospect,
will probably serve a Furman-type role, guiding the states in creating
constitutional death penalty statutes for persons under age sixteen.
Most likely, the Court will have the opportunity, within a few years,
to hear the appeal of a fifteen-year-old' 66 juvenile offender receiving
a post-Thompson death sentence. However, until such time, no juve-
nile offender who commits a capital crime under the age of sixteen
can be lawfully executed in the United States.
ant, having a mental age of approximately 7 or 8, was sentenced to death for a murder
he committed at age 24. In remanding the case, the Supreme Court directed the
Supreme Court of Mississippi to reconsider Jones' death sentence in light of the
Thompson decision. Id.
163. Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 311-12 (1972) (White, J., concurring).
164. Id (White, J., concurring).
165. See supra text accompanying notes 108-09.
166. Although Thompson theoretically allows for states to amend death penalty
statutes to include persons under the age of 15, the last person under 15 to be executed
was a 14-year-old boy in 1944. V. STREIB, supra note 36, at 107. Because no person
under age 15 has received a death sentence since then, it seems unlikely that states
will go much lower than 15. However, Edwin Meese, President Reagan's former attor-
ney general, once commented that "it would depend on the circumstances whether
someone as young as fourteen should be executed." H. BEDAU, DEATH IS DIFFERENT
152 (1987); see also Stewart & Nelson, Hip Deep in the Death Penalty, A.B.A. J., Nov.
1, 1988, at 42.
B. The Future Impact on Juvenile Executions
1. The Changing Ideology of the Court
Thompson is not the first time the Court has been deeply divided
on capital punishment issues. Ever since the Furman decision, 16 7 the
Supreme Court Justices have developed particular ideologies con-
cerning the death penalty, resulting in certain predictable trends.
For example, Chief Justice Rehnquist has never voted against the
death penalty in any Supreme Court opinion.168 Predictably, he
joined the Thompson dissent. On the opposite pole, Justices Marshall
and Brennan have never voted in favor of the death penalty and
often are the only dissenters in cases upholding the death penalty for
adults.169 They, of course, supported the plurality decisions in
Thompson.
The opinions of the other plurality Justices-Justices Blackmun
and Stevens-are not so easily categorized. Although Justice Stevens
appears to disfavor capital punishment,170 Justice Blackmun dis-
sented in Furman, along with Justice Rehnquist, and generally votes
in favor of the death penalty.171 However, the Thompson decision
leaves little doubt that the four plurality Justices firmly believe, and
will continue to hold, that the execution of persons committing capi-
tal crimes while under the age of sixteen is cruel and unusual.172
Since the three dissenting Justices-Justice Scalia, Justice White,
and the Chief Justice-appear equally committed to the opposing
view,'73 Justices O'Connor and Kennedy ostensibly will be deciding
the issue in the future, assuming states react to the concurring opin-
ion and expressly make persons under sixteen death eligible. How-
ever, since Justice O'Connor suggests that she will accept the states'
167. See supra notes 14-20 and accompanying text.
168. H. BEDAU, supra note 9, at 253.
169. Id. at 252-53. Justices Brennan and Marshall, the Court's most liberal mem-
bers, generally vote together on key issues. Taylor, Rehnquist's Court: Tuning out the
White House, N.Y. Times, Sept. 11, 1988, at 38, col. 1.
170. For example, Justice Stevens voted against a mandatory death -penalty in
Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280 (1976), and the death penalty for rape in
Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584 (1977). See supra notes 25-30 and accompanying text.
However, his ideology is difficult to classify since he often joins the more liberal Jus-
tices on some key issues, such as abortion and affirmative action, yet joins the conserv-
atives on others.
171. Justice Blackmun dissented in Woodson, although he voted against the death
penalty for rape in Coker. See supra notes 25-30 and accompanying text. Although
Justice Blackmun professes to oppose the death penalty, he hesitates to overturn death
sentences because state legislatures have the authority to abolish capital punishment.
Jenkins, A Candid Talk with Justice Blackmun, N.Y. Times, Feb. 20, 1983, at 20, col. 1;
see M. MELTSNER, CRUEL AND UNUSUAL: THE SUPREME COURT AND CAPITAL PUNISH-
MENT 197-98 (1973) (noting that Justice Blackmun questions whether capital punish-
ment is "an effective deterrent").
172. See supra note 100 and accompanying text.
173. See supra note 123 and accompanying text.
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decision in the matter,174 Justice Kennedy's vote will likely serve
to break the resulting 4-4 tie. How he will vote is still anyone's
guess.175
2. The Impact on Juvenile Offenders Age 16 and Older
A more predictable matter is how the Court will decide two up-
coming cases concerning older juvenile offenders: Stanford v. Ken-
tucky 176 and Wilkins v. Missouri.1 77 Since those cases involve
seventeen- and sixteen-year-old offenders, another look at the Ed-
dings ruling178 is quite insightful. Even though Monty Lee Eddings
was just sixteen at the time of his crime, Chief Justice Rehnquist and
174. Although Justice O'Connor is considered a moderate, she generally votes to
uphold states' rights. Blasi, Praise for the Court's Unpredictability, N.Y. Times, July
16, 1986, at 23, col. 2. However, concerning key constitutional issues, Justice O'Connor
has a tendency to be less conservative and "to keep one eye on the Constitution, one
eye on the real world, and an open mind to judge what she sees." Sperling, Justice in
the Middle: On the Jurisprudence of Sandra Day O'Connor, Possibly the Swing Vote
on the New Supreme Court, THE ATLANTIC, Mar. 1988, at 26. Moreover, in a recent
interview, Justice Blackmun indicated that Justice O'Connor "agonized over whether
[a] 15-year-old murderer could be put to death because 'the soft spots in her armor...
are children and women.'" Taylor, supra note 169, at 38. This may indicate Justice
O'Connor's willingness to reconsider her position on juvenile death sentences in future
cases.
175. Justice Anthony Kennedy has been described as a conservative with quasi-lib-
eral tendencies, thus making his decisions difficult to predict. Williams, The Opinions
of Anthony Kennedy: No Time for Ideology, A.B.A.J., Mar. 1, 1988, at 59. In fact, "de-
spite [his] having written more than 430 opinions during his 12 years on the 9th Cir-
cuit, and despite [his] having undergone questioning by the . . . Senate Judiciary
Committee ... no one knows how a Justice Kennedy would treat the most divisive
issues of our day .... Id. at 56. Justice Kennedy has issued opinions both upholding
and reversing death sentences in particular cases. Compare Neuschafer v. McKay, 807
F.2d 839 (9th Cir. 1987) (voting to remand a death sentence for consideration of
whether the defendant had initiated his confession) with Adamson v. Ricketts, 789
F.2d 722 (9th Cir. 1986), rev'd, 107 S. Ct. 2680 (1987) (dissenting from an opinion find-
ing the defendant ineligible for the death penalty due to double jeopardy).
However, since joining the Court in early 1988, Justice Kennedy has provided,
through his conservative vote, "a razor-thin 5 to 4 majority in a number of key cases in
the criminal justice and civil rights areas." Sitomer, Justice Kennedy Makes Conserva-
tive Difference in Supreme Court Case, The Christian Sci. Monitor, June 27, 1988, at 5.
In fact, he joined Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices O'Connor, Scalia, and White in
eight of the nine decisions in which the Court clearly divided into conservative and lib-
eral factions. Taylor, supra note 169, at 38. Despite this early conservative voting
trend, Justice Kennedy is still considered "a question mark." 1d.
176. 734 S.W.2d 781 (Ky. 1987), cert. granted, 109 S. Ct. 217 (1988).
177. 736 S.W.2d 409 (Mo. 1987), cert. granted, 108 S. Ct. 2896 (1988). The Supreme
Court heard oral arguments in Stanford and Wilkins on March 27, 1989. However, as
of April 17, 1989, the Court had not issued its decisions in those cases. Telephone con-
versation with the U.S. Supreme Court clerk (Apr. 17, 1989).
178. See supra notes 39-41 and accompanying text.
Justices White and Blackmun noted in their dissent that they would
vote to sustain Eddings' death sentence on constitutional grounds.179
This is clearly unwelcome news for defendants Stanford and Wil-
kins,1so because it strongly suggests that Justice Blackmun, one of
the Thompson plurality, will vote to sustain the death penalty for of-
fenders over the age of fifteen. Thus, even assuming no further
change in ideology, the present Court is unlikely to hold the death
penalty unconstitutional for persons who commit crimes at age six-
teen to eighteen. Given the Court's struggle to reach a consensus as
to juveniles under age sixteen, this result would not be surprising.
Notwithstanding the accuracy of these predictions, the Court could
experience a major change in Justices--and ideologies-in the very
near future. While the more conservative Justices are relatively
young,' 8 ' the liberal members of the Court are aging and developing
significant health problems,18 2 sparking rumors of imminent retire-
ment.183 If these rumors prove true, the Court's position on many
key issues, including capital punishment for both juveniles and
adults, will be dictated by the future Court appointments of newly-
elected President George Bush, a known moderate with conservative
tendencies. 8 4
Although politics naturally plays a role in Supreme Court appoint-
ments, the Justices have expressed concern over the public's "percep-
tion that constitutionality is nothing more than the cumulative
product of the political parties' power and luck at controlling new ap-
pointments." 8 5 However, as one of the most important, yet divisive,
179. Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104, 128 (1982) (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
180. However, the defendant in Wilkins may not be so disappointed. Wilkins, who
was 16 years old at the time of his offense, told the sentencing judge that he preferred
the death penalty over life imprisonment. He explained to the judge: "One I fear, and
one I don't." V. STREIB, supra note 36, at 182; see also Reidinger, The Death Row Kids,
A.B.A. J., Apr. 1, 1989, at 79.
181.* The Chief Justice is 63 years old; Justice Scalia, 52; Justice Kennedy, 52; Jus-
tice O'Connor, 58; and Justice White, 71. Taylor, supra note 169, at 38.
182. Justice Brennan is 82; Justice Marshall, 80; and Justice Blackmun, 80. Id
183. Id To the contrary, Justice Brennan has indicated: "If God spares me, I'll be
here for a long time." Id Justice Marshall has stated that "he was appointed for life
and ... will serve out his term." Id These Justices' decisions are not without prece-
dent. Several past Justices remained on the Court until their mid- to late-80s, and Jus-
tice Oliver Wendell Holmes sat on the Court until his retirement at age 90.
Greenhouse, Taking the Supreme Court's Pulse, N.Y. Times, Jan. 28, 1984, at 8, col. 3.
184. Although President Bush professes not to have an ideology, present specula-
tion is that he will follow President Reagan's lead. Shapiro, The Differences That Re-
ally Matter, TIME, 'Nov. 7, 1988, at 22-26. While Bush may be tempted to appoint
moderates to the Supreme Court, he will receive intense lobbying from fellow Repub-
licans to appoint conservative Justices, particularly those opposing abortion, and it is
anticipated that he will succumb to such pressure. Id at 25.
185. Sperling, supra note 174, at 26; see Taylor, supra note 169, at 38. For example,
many Supreme Court watchers predict that the present Court, under Chief Justice
Rehnquist's direction, will soon reverse its pro-abortion decision in Roe v. Wade, 410
U.S. 113 (1973), and that a later Court, possibly within 10 years, will vote for its rein-
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constitutional issues of our day, capital punishment undoubtedly will
continue to be controlled, to some extent, by political forces. Given
the frequent political changes within the executive branch and the
inevitable retirement or death of Court members, the Court's final
word on both adult and juvenile executions may not be heard for a
long time-if ever.
VIII. CONCLUSION
When all is said and done, Thompson v. Oklahoma may be much
ado about nothing. Although William Wayne Thompson and two
others successfully evaded their would-be executioners, there is little
hope that other fourteen- or fifteen-year-olds will be able to do the
same. The present Supreme Court has essentially stated that it will
not interfere with such executions, provided the offender is sen-
tenced under a statute expressly authorizing the death penalty for of-
fenders under age sixteen. Although Justice O'Connor gives the
impression that she hopes the states will draw the line for death eli-
gibility at age sixteen, this probably is wishful thinking. Given the
death penalty's substantial support in a few states, the future execu-
tion of a small number of juvenile offenders under the age of sixteen
appears inevitable.
Ironically, only four or five other countries-Pakistan, Bangladesh,
Barbados, Rwanda, and possibly Iran-authorize the death penalty
for persons under age eighteen at the time they commit their
crimes.186 With all other western countries and the United Nations
opposing such a practice, the United States is keeping dubious com-
pany indeed. Even the Soviet Union has declared the execution of
juveniles within this country an "American failing.' 8 7 Given the
rarity of such executions, it appears most Americans would agree.
As discussed previously,188 the occasional execution of a juvenile
offender will not serve any of the legitimate social purposes underly-
ing capital punishment. In fact, it will do little more than assuage a
particular judge or jury's distaste for a particular juvenile-not for
statement. Sperling, supra note 174, at 26. Of course, decisions declaring abortion
legal, then tantamount to murder, and finally legal again, all within a 20- to 30-year
time period, are likely to confuse the public and give it a jaded sense that constitution-
ality depends upon the opinions of nine people. Id.
186. See supra note 88.
187. Shipler, Washington Talk: Soviet-American Relations, N.Y. Times, Nov. 10,
1987, at 20, col. 1. In fact, the Soviet Union sent one of its officials to hear the oral
arguments in Thompson. Id.
188. See supra notes 131-85 and accompanying text.
juvenile killers as a whole. For example, although two fifteen-year-
old killers may have equal levels of emotional immaturity, one may
be sentenced to death simply because he looks much older while an-
other may be spared because he appears younger. Although the ar-
gument of arbitrariness supports the abolition of capital punishment
for all ages, it is particularly appropriate when applied to children,
who are often unable to fully appreciate the consequences of their
actions.
Unfortunately, the present Supreme Court's failure to employ
Thompson to declare juvenile executions for offenders under age six-
teen per se unconstitutional is unlikely to be remedied in the next
such case, which will presumably come before an even more con-
servative Court. Since newly elected President George Bush is al-
ready receiving intense lobbying to fill Court vacancies during his
term with conservatives, 8 9 any immediate appointees are unlikely to
take a liberal view of capital punishment, even as applied to minors.
Thus, the nation will have to look ahead to a future Supreme Court
to end this deplorable practice, hopefully before the lives of many
children are lost.
SUSAN M. SIMMONS
189. See supra note 184 and accompanying text.
